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Abstract 
This study explores how multi-sided digital platforms achieve and sustain superior 
performance positions in turbulent markets. Specifically, the effects of three major 
strategies are studied: (1) a complementarity-based innovation strategy, (2) a breaching 
strategy where a platform expands into rival territories by introducing its offerings in 
rival platforms to gain access to rivals’ consumers without having to switch them over, 
(3) the joint use of these strategies. Multi-sided platform markets tend to exhibit 
turbulence; hence, platform strategies need to focus on achieving and sustaining superior 
performance positions for longer periods. We use agent-based simulation models to show 
that innovation and breaching strategies contribute to platform performance. Multi-
sided platforms that pursue a breaching strategy in addition to engaging in innovations 
achieve higher performance positions than those that only engage in innovations. Our 
analyses also generated insights about the importance of a fit between the decision rules 
that platforms follow in implementing their strategies and consumer decision structures. 
Keywords: Multi-sided digital platforms; Digital business strategies; Agent-based modeling 
 
Introduction 
Firms increasingly embrace the platform marketplace idea by either transforming their businesses into 
platforms or creating new platforms (Hagiu, 2007). Multi-sided platforms are businesses that enable 
transactions among different sides (e.g., between consumers and developers) without taking ownership and 
control over products (Hagiu & Wright, 2013). Prominent firms such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have 
adopted platform models in their businesses. For example, Google’s search business is a multi-sided 
platform where consumers transact with content providers and advertisers. Similarly, the core of the 
Apple’s mobile business, iOS App Store is a multi-sided platform where consumers transact directly with 
application developers. These multi-sided digital platforms differ from traditional businesses in various 
ways such as by the strength of network effects and switching costs, governance and pricing structures, and 
product designs (Anderson, Parker, & Tan, 2014; Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Gawer, 2009; 
Hagiu & Spulber, 2013; Parker & Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & Tirole, 2006; Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). 
In multi-sided platform markets, constantly changing needs and preferences on the consumer side and 
frequent new offerings on the platform and complementor side lead to dynamic interactions and 
interdependencies. We show that these interactions and interdependencies are nonlinear, leading to 
increasing complexity (Cilliers, 2000; Page, 2009). In turn, complexity leads to increasing turbulence and 
unpredictability in markets in which performance rank orderings of firms change and fluctuate in high 
degrees (D’Aveni & Gunther, 1994), product cycles are short and competitive landscapes rapidly shift in 
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unforeseen ways (Eisenhardt, 1989). In these markets, leading firms are constantly pursued by challengers 
that aggressively find new ways to destroy the competitive advantage of the leaders (D’Aveni, Dagnino, & 
Smith, 2010); hence, platform strategies need to cope with these dynamisms. We identify and conceptualize 
a platform fitness1 strategy to extend the scope of competitive strategies in platform markets such as 
expansion strategies (Hagiu, 2006), standards setting (Boudreau, 2010; West, 2003), pricing and 
foreclosure strategies (Eisenmann, Parker, & Alstyne, 2006; Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). 
This study seeks to contribute to the literature on multi-sided platform markets in two ways. First, the study 
seeks to discuss how complexity emerges in multi-sided platform markets from the interactions and 
interdependencies among consumer actions and platform offerings, and how it leads to a high level of 
turbulence and unpredictability in these markets. Second, the study seeks to examine the effects on 
platform fitness levels of (1) a complementarity-based innovation strategy, (2) a new kind of strategic 
penetration into rival platform markets, –breaching–, which contributes to fitness by evoking and 
enhancing exploratory learning, and (3) the joint use of these strategies. We take a complex adaptive 
systems perspective to study these strategies, more specifically, to study the interaction effect resulting from 
the joint use of both the innovation and breaching strategies. We build on and extend the theories on 
organizational fitness in complex adaptive ecosystems to embrace exploratory learning and innovation. The 
importance of learning and the need for exploratory and experiential learning when existing knowledge 
offers little insight are hardly controversial (e.g., March, 1991; McGrath, 2001). However, how exploratory 
learning can be prosecuted in the platform strategy context, and how such a strategy can translate into 
higher performance levels on a complex fitness landscape are not nearly so well understood. We show in 
turbulent and unpredictable platform markets that achieving and renewing performance advantages are 
constant struggles, and that complementarity-based innovation and breaching strategies positively 
contribute to platform performance. More specifically, platforms that employ the breaching strategy in 
addition to engaging in complementarity-based innovations achieve the best results. This result extends the 
theories of fitness in complex adaptive systems to multi-sided platform markets by describing how 
exploratory and experiential learning could be pursued as a platform strategy to achieve higher fitness 
levels, and how such a strategy can affect platform performance through complementarity-based 
innovations. Finally, our model offers insights about the importance of a fit in these markets between the 
decision rules that platforms follow in implementing their strategies and consumer decision structures. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The emergence of platform businesses has triggered a shift in competition from the conventional product-
level competition to a new, platform-level competition (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Hagiu, 2006; Zhu & Iansiti, 
2012). Platform-based firms compete not only on individual products but also as platform ecosystems. They 
are composed of a large set of diverse agents interacting with one another in nonlinear ways. For example, 
Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android OS platforms compete with each other as platform ecosystems over which 
thousands of developers offer millions of applications to billions of consumers (Statista, 2014). On the 
consumption side, these platforms compete for consumers and seek to become a single-stop shop for all 
their information and entertainment needs (Yoffie & Rossano, 2012). On the production side, they compete 
for complementors (e.g., application developers, content providers) and try to convince them to participate 
in their platforms (Boudreau, 2012). By making connections to millions of consumers and complementors, 
these platforms seek to create direct and indirect network effects, and increase switching costs in their favor 
(Eisenmann et al., 2006; Evans, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). As they compete for the same pool of 
consumers and complementors, interdependence increases. That is, if one platform performs well by 
attracting consumers and complementors and locking them in, rival platforms perform poorly. Consider 
the usually two-sided internet browsers market (i.e., consumers at one side and add-on developers at the 
other side). Figure 1 shows how frequently and significantly performance rank orderings have changed in 
this market2. In just five years, Chrome has emerged as the market leader, Internet Explorer and Firefox 
lost significant market share. In addition to having interdependent performance levels, platforms are 
diverse, adaptive, and connected. These characteristics define complex adaptive systems (Cilliers, 1998). 
                                                             
1 Fitness refers to the performance in achieving positive payoffs during the course of interactions 
(Holland, 1995; Siggelkow, 2001). 
2 In Figure 1, even though the market leader changed once, there are ten rank ordering changes in total. 
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Figure 1: Share of global usage of end users 
for internet browsers (StatCounter, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 2: A screenshot of the Google Maps 
update on Apple iOS device iPad (2014) 
 
Multi-sided Platform Markets as Complex Adaptive Systems 
Frequent and significant performance rank ordering changes in multi-sided digital platform ecosystems are 
a likely consequence of complexity in these ecosystems. Scholars of complexity inform us that moderate 
levels of (1) diversity, (2) adaptation, (3) connectedness, and (4) interdependence among the agents in an 
ecosystem lead to complex adaptive systems (Cilliers, 1998; Page, 2009). Complex adaptive systems are 
formed by a large number of agents whose nonlinear interactions lead to continual flux and uncertainty 
(Holland, 1995). When agents in an ecosystem exhibit low levels of diversity, adaptation, connectedness, 
and interdependence, the system is simple or complicated. When agents exhibit high levels of these 
characteristics, the system is chaotic. An essential difference between a simple or complicated versus a 
chaotic system is that the former systems are decomposable into their parts; however, the latter is not. The 
behaviors of decomposable systems can be inferred from its parts. Social systems are not decomposable, 
and at best they are nearly-decomposable (Cilliers, 2001). That is, in complex adaptive social systems, the 
system-level behavior can be very different from the behaviors of individuals or agents (Simon, 1962): 
Roughly, by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a 
nonsimple way. In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate, 
metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts and the 
laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole. (p. 468) 
Accordingly, the fitness landscapes3 that correspond to simple or complicated —i.e., decomposable—
systems may have a single peak or a series of peaks, constituting a rugged landscape (Page, 2009; Rivkin, 
2000). Given enough time and resources, the outcomes in these landscapes can be maximized by 
incremental search. Complex adaptive systems, however, constitute dancing rugged fitness landscapes 
(Kaufmann, 1993; Levinthal & Warglien, 1999), and they require nonincremental search and exploration. 
This is because these landscapes constantly morph and the peaks on them collapse or emerge accordingly. 
Our development below indicates that multi-sided platform markets form complex adaptive systems. 
Diverse and Adaptive. Multi-sided platforms are moderately diverse. They use similar structures and 
offer similar features and services, but they are also diverse and differentiated. Platforms have digital 
infrastructures, technology standards and business rules that seek to solve a common problem for their 
stakeholders: e.g., users, third party developers, advertisers, or content providers. Consider Apple iOS and 
Google Android OS. As individual platforms make decisions on infrastructure, technology standards, and 
business rules, mimic and copy one another’s capabilities, they contribute to the emergence of similarity in 
the industry. However, they have differences in their decisions (e.g., open versus proprietary standards, 
compatible versus incompatible technologies, business models that emphasize device sales vs. advertising 
revenues and fees, etc.). Multi-sided platforms are also moderately adaptive. They invest in technologies, 
                                                             
3 An important concept in this regard is the notion of a fitness landscape introduced by Wright (1931, 
1932). In such a landscape, fitness is a measure of how successfully agents move from “fitness valleys” to 
“fitness peaks.” Organizations aim higher fitness by migrating toward peaks (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2002). 
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standards, and business rules to increase their capacity to adapt to environmental changes. For example, 
they digitally track and analyze behaviors of their consumers, complementors, and rivals, and adjust their 
actions accordingly. They develop intelligent responses to competitive moves of rivals and meet changing 
consumer needs and preferences. However, even with superior capabilities, platforms are not fully adaptive 
to the dynamically evolving environment. For example, in gaming platforms market, PlayStation and Xbox 
platforms better adapted to the changes in user behavior in online social networks by adding extensive 
social interaction features than Nintendo's Wii platform, which, could not adapt to these changes.  
Connected and Interdependent. Multi-sided platforms are moderately connected to one another. 
Because they compete for the same pools of consumers, complementors, and advertisers, and use similar 
types of technologies, standards, and business rules, they are connected to one another through these 
stakeholders and tools. Because most of their processes and interfaces are digitized, the connections among 
platforms are established easily. For example, similar application programming interfaces (APIs) offered 
to encourage independent parties to develop complementary offerings increase connectedness. Multi-sided 
platforms are also moderately interdependent. They have various dependency relationships with their 
rivals (e.g., manufacturing, supply, distribution, marketing agreements, and joint ventures) and with their 
consumers (e.g., marketing, advertising, services). APIs also contribute to the interdependency of platform-
based competitors because they tend to use similar standards. Multi-sided digital platforms are 
interdependent also because they compete for the same pools of consumers and complementors. 
In addition to the complexity arising from the composition of platform markets, we argue that network 
effects and switching costs contribute to complexity, thereby increasing turbulence and unpredictability. 
Network Effects as a Source of Complexity 
Network effects in the form of network externalities have been extensively studied in the networks literature 
(Fuentelsaz, Maicas, & Polo, 2012; Shankar & Bayus, 2003; Zhu & Iansiti, 2007, 2012). Because multi-sided 
platforms compete with each other both for consumers and for complementors, there are network 
externalities on both the production side and the consumption side (Gandal, 1995; Venkatraman & Lee, 
2004). From a game theory perspective, network effects arise from scale economies; i.e., the available 
surplus per consumer increases with the increasing size of a consumer base or with the increasing amount 
of offerings by complementors on a platform due to scale advantages. These sources of scale advantages 
define direct and indirect network effects. In case of direct network externalities, consumers benefit more 
from a platform as the quantity (and quality) of consumers who adopt the platform increases (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985). In case of indirect network externalities, consumers benefit more from a platform as the 
quantity (and quality) of complementary offerings on the platform increases (Gandal, 1995). Therefore, 
network externalities are likely to contribute to lock-in of consumers to platforms when they are positive 
(Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). Network externalities bring multi-sided platform markets increasing 
diversity, connectedness, and interdependencies of the constituents. As the network size and strength4 
increase, the potential utility consumers can gain from a platform increases. The increased attractiveness 
brings in more consumers, and hence more developers, advertisers and other complementors on one hand; 
increases the complexity on the other hand. Increased network externalities attract even more consumers, 
which in turn is likely to increase network externalities. These feedback loops and increased connectedness 
and interdependencies of nonlinearly interacting diverse constituents of an ecosystem lead to increasing 
complexity, thereby increasing the turbulence and unpredictability in platform ecosystems. 
Switching Costs as a Source of Complexity 
Switching costs can arise from various sources. The cost can be procedural (economic risk, evaluation, 
learning, setup costs), financial (benefit loss, monetary loss costs), or relational (personal relationship, 
brand relationship costs) (Burnham, Frels, & Mahajan, 2003). Like network effects, switching costs arise 
because consumers desire compatibility. That is, consumers want a group of their purchases to be 
compatible with one another, creating economies of scope among purchases on a single platform (Farrell & 
Klemperer, 2007). Consumers face significant switching costs when their investments specific to a platform 
decrease in value or become obsolete after they switch to another platform. For example, consumers spend 
                                                             
4 The quantity of connections defines the size of a network and the quality of connections defines the 
strength of a network. These two dimensions together denote a measure for the network externalities. 
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time and other resources to learn how to use an adopted platform and accumulate platform-specific 
application data on the platform. If consumers switch to another platform, they are incurred additional 
costs to learn how to use a new platform, invest in a new set of complementarities that are compatible with 
the new platform, and port their data to the new platform. These costs play a significant role in switching 
decisions (Teece et al., 1997), and switching costs contribute to consumer lock-in (Fuentelsaz et al., 2012). 
If there are both strong network effects and significant switching costs, consumer lock-in is more likely in 
a platform ecosystem, as evident in the winner-take-all phenomenon (Eisenmann, 2007; Sheremata, 2004). 
If there are not significant switching costs, however, network externalities may not provide a strong enough 
incentive to lock in consumers. In the telecommunications industry, for example, despite strong network 
externalities harnessed by mobile operators, consumers tend to switch as soon as phone number portability 
is introduced (Fuentelsaz et al., 2012; Viard, 2007). Similarly, consider Groupon, a deal-of-the-day website 
that features discounted gift certificates and coupons. As more consumers sign up and shop at 
Groupon.com, Groupon offers better-priced deals. Therefore, indirect network externalities are present. 
There are also product and service reviews by consumers, creating direct network externalities. In fact, 
Groupon’s network has the strongest network effects by network size as the firm holds the largest share in 
the deal-of-the day market (Statista, 2013). However, Groupon’s competitors, led by LivingSocial, did not 
have any struggle to attract its consumers because switching costs were lacking. Consumers switched to 
competitors easily, or used Groupon and its competitors at the same time, a phenomenon called multi-
homing. When consumers in a market increasingly switch between competitors, and switch between single-
homing and multi-homing decisions, nonlinear interactions and interdependencies among consumers, 
complementors, and platform providers are likely to increase, giving rise to complexity in the market. 
Competition in Complex Adaptive Platform Ecosystems 
In multi-sided digital platform markets where “winner-take-all” is not the outcome, the compositional 
characteristics of market constituents (i.e., diversity, adaptiveness, connectedness, and interdependence), 
the presence of network effects, and lack of significant switching costs lead to complex adaptive ecosystems. 
In these complex systems, cause-effect relationships are not proportional. Unexpected and unintended 
consequences, or surprises, are the expected behaviors of the system (McDaniel, Jordan, & Fleeman, 2003). 
In a complex adaptive system, system-level behaviors are emergent and unpredictable, and they are 
different from the behaviors of the individual parts that make up the system (Holland, 1995; Simon, 1962). 
Increasing complexity leads to turbulent changes in the fitness landscape of the industry (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000), where turbulence denotes both the magnitude and frequency of the changes (Miller, Ogilvie, 
& Glick, 2006; Wholey & Brittain, 1989). Peaks that represent high performance positions in the industry’s 
fitness landscape could collapse unexpectedly and unpredictably. Brand new peaks could emerge. The 
topography of the competitive landscape starts to dance and morph. Individual platforms face major 
challenges in achieving and sustaining higher fitness levels because of the difficulty in repositioning to 
emerging performance positions (Tanriverdi, Rai, & Venkatraman, 2010). As incumbents fall from their 
performance positions and other platforms take over the emerging peaks, performance rank orderings of 
the platforms change in unexpected ways. Multi-sided platforms that fall from high performance positions 
continuously attempt to move back up to peak performance positions and in the process disrupt the current 
occupants, and contribute to a constant state of disequilibrium and turbulence in performance rank 
orderings of all competitors (D’Aveni et al., 2010; D’Aveni, 1995; Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005). 
Platform providers need strategies that can cope with the increasing complexity, turbulent and 
unpredictable changes in the fitness landscapes of platform ecosystems (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; 
Levinthal, 1997). One way to achieve higher fitness levels in these turbulent ecosystems is to engage in 
exploratory and experiential learning, which involves increased variation by search, experimentation, and 
innovation (March, 1991). Absent a base of cause-and-effect understanding, exploration and 
experimentation generates information that cannot be obtained by any other way (McGrath, 2001). The 
concept of exploratory learning translates into fitness landscapes as learning from a mix of short and long 
jumps. Platform providers should engage not only in neighborhood search as in the form of local “hill 
climbing” (Holland, 1975; March & Simon, 1958) but also in long jumps, which are the random explorations 
of the distant portions of a landscape (Kaufmann, 1993; Levinthal & Warglien, 1999). The importance of 
learning and the need for exploratory and experiential learning when existing knowledge offers little insight 
are hardly controversial (e.g., March, 1991; McGrath, 2001). However, how exploratory and experiential 
learning could be pursued as a strategy, specifically in the context of multi-sided platform markets, and how 
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this strategy could be transformed into higher performance levels in a complex fitness landscape are not 
nearly so well understood. We focus on three strategies and their effects on fitness levels to contribute to 
the literature in these areas: (1) a complementarity-based innovation strategy, (2) a breaching strategy that 
involves a novel way to expand strategically into a rival platform territory, and (3) a strategy that involves 
the joint use of the innovation and breaching strategies. We recognize the well-established contribution of 
an innovation strategy to firm performance and extend it by discussing the critical importance of 
complementarities in multi-sided platform markets. We also conceptualize a new strategy, breaching, and 
study its role in supplementing the complementarity-based innovation strategy in its fitness contribution. 
Complementarity-based Innovation Strategy 
As the complexity of a competitive landscape increases, platform providers face increasing levels of variety 
in needs and preferences of consumers and complementors such as independent developers and 
advertisers. When the external variety on an adaptive biological or social system exceeds the internal variety 
of the system, there emerges an adaptive tension (McKelvey, 2001). As Ashby’s law of requisite variety 
states, only variety can absorb variety (Ashby, 1958; Beer, 1979, 1981). That is, to ensure its integrity and 
survival, a system must be adaptive, and must increase the variety of its internal order to match the variety 
imposed by its environment. Thus, one major competitive strategy in coping with the external complexity 
and the variety of multi-sided platform markets is to increase the internal variety of a platform (Boisot & 
McKelvey, 2010). However, how the internal variety is increased is also important. Internal variety can be 
increased by launching new exploratory offerings (March, 1991) or by launching new exploratory but at the 
same time complementary offerings and configuring them into the current bundles of offerings (Lee, 
Venkatraman, Tanriverdi, & Iyer, 2010). The more innovative and complementary offerings on a platform, 
the more likely the platform is to meet the needs and preferences of the participants. Not surprisingly, 
prominent mobile platforms, such as Apple iOS and Google Android OS, for example, offer millions of 
applications. They also focus on certain types of complementarity relationships, such as in the case of email, 
calendar, contacts, and tasks by Google. An innovation-based strategy is consistent with the prevailing 
explanation for turbulence in environments such as with Schumpeter's explanation that innovation-based 
competition for product markets creates a state of constant disequilibrium (1942), as innovative entrants 
make frequent, aggressive, and unforeseen moves to disrupt incumbents (D’Aveni & Gunther, 1994). 
Product-based innovations are not sufficient in platform-based competition. Innovations must complement 
existing offerings to increase fitness of a platform because the consumers of the platform adopt the 
innovative applications as a complementary set to benefit from the economies of scope (Farrell & 
Klemperer, 2007). Therefore, our emphasis in this study is on a platform's strategy to introduce 
complementary innovations on the platform, but not the isolated disruptions at the product level. Only 
innovations that are complementary and that promise compatibility could attract consumers who seek for 
network externalities (Gandal, 1995). Increased complementarity relationships among the offerings that 
the consumers of a platform adopt are likely to increase switching costs for the consumers when these 
relationships are platform-specific, creating lock-in effects. Similarly, network externalities increase and 
make a platform more attractive for other consumers due to the increased use of the complementary 
offerings that are compatible with the platform. The diversity in the needs and preferences of consumers 
could only be matched by increasing the internal variety, thereby creating a repertoire of offerings that are 
at least as nuanced as the needs and preferences of consumers. However, as product-level innovations may 
not be sufficiently effective at the platform-level to create the desired network externalities and switching 
costs, hence locking in consumers to control turbulence and unpredictability arising from complexity, we 
argue that platforms need to engage in complementarity-based innovations to achieve higher fitness. 
Hypothesis 1: Multi-sided platforms that engage in a complementarity-based innovation strategy are 
more likely to achieve higher performance levels than the rival platforms that do not employ this strategy. 
Breaching Strategy 
Multi-sided platform markets as complex adaptive systems provide a challenge for the traditional, routine-
based organizational learning where organizations repeat the actions and strategies that were proven 
successful in the past, and stop repeating the actions that are associated with negative outcomes (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). Two major mechanisms to update these cause-and-effect 
oriented routines, search and experimentation (Levitt & March, 1988), are rules rather than exceptions to 
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achieve higher fitness levels in complex adaptive systems. This is because cause-effect relationships are not 
linear, blurred, and complexity hinders learning from evidence (Sterman, 2006). Unintended consequences 
emerge as the constituents of a system interact nonlinearly and the outcomes aggregate in unexpected ways 
(Sargut & McGrath, 2011), leading to turbulence and unpredictability in fitness landscapes (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998; Levinthal, 1997). These fitness landscapes are not only rugged but also dancing; 
therefore, nonincremental search and exploration are needed to increase the likelihood of achieving higher 
performance peaks as the landscape morphs (Kaufmann, 1993; Levinthal & Warglien, 1999). In multi-sided 
platform markets, breaching strategy, as we term it here, provides a novel way for platforms to engage in 
nonincremental search and exploration in the rival territories of a landscape. Behaving as if they are 
complementors to rival platforms, platforms that take breaching actions gain access to the rivals’ turfs5. We 
recognize the potential effects of breaching in the form of direct fitness benefits such as in additional sales 
and advertising revenues (cf. Adner, Chen, & Zhu, 2014); however, we also argue that another primary 
benefit of a multi-sided digital platform from pursuing a breaching strategy is exploratory learning. 
Breaching strategy evokes and enhances search and monitoring mechanisms of a platform provider that 
feed into exploratory learning (Huber, 1991; McGrath, 2001). An important concept in this regard is 
Wright's (1931, 1932) notion of a fitness landscape, or an organization’s performance landscape (Levinthal 
& Siggelkow, 2001). In a complex adaptive system, the landscape characteristics, the height, shape, or 
location of peaks change, new peaks arise, and so forth (Siggelkow, 2001); therefore, intelligence is 
constantly needed in the landscape, not only in the neighborhood area of a platform but also in the distant 
parts of the landscape (Holland, 1975; March & Simon, 1958). Breaching allows platforms to collect valuable 
intelligence on the needs and preferences of consumers and complementors by taking a mix of short and 
long jumps, and exploring the distant parts in the landscape. Platforms that take breaching actions have 
the opportunity to engage in diverse interactions with the rivals’ consumers and complementors and learn 
from them as they explore the landscape. For example, in the mobile platforms market, the engagement is 
through feedback and review mechanisms. Mobile platforms that use the breaching strategy receive a 
diverse set of feedback from the rivals’ consumers. They also engage in a closer relationship with the rivals’ 
complementors through the direct interactions with developer communities. The outcomes of these 
interactions increase internal variety through exploratory learning (March, 1991) and contribute to 
platform fitness (Levinthal, 1997). Figure 2 shows an example of learning from a rival platform’s territory, 
in this case learning by Google from Apple's iOS consumers. As shown in the figure, Google improves its 
Google Maps application (app) based on the feedback provided by Apple’s consumers through app reviews. 
In the markets where turbulence and unpredictability are norms rather than exceptions, those 
organizations that prove to have superior exploration of the landscape are likely to adapt to changing 
circumstances better than their rivals (McGrath, 2001). Multi-sided digital platforms that employ the 
breaching strategy can better adapt to the changes arising from the changing consumer needs and 
preferences, and the rapid, significant, and unpredictable changes in network externalities and switching 
costs. The enhanced exploratory learning provides an opportunity to create the type of complementarity 
and compatibility relationships among a platform’s offerings that are needed to match the needs and 
preferences of consumers. These platforms have an advantage in attracting consumers from rival networks 
because they learn from rival consumers to create the type of positive network externalities the consumers 
in the distant parts of the landscape desire the most. They manage the interdependencies and 
connectedness arising from network externalities more effectively. Using the breaching strategy also helps 
them manage the complexity arising from switching costs because they sense and make sense of the changes 
in rival territories. They pursue adaptations in their offerings accordingly and match the offerings of rivals 
to discourage switching out of their platforms. They create the types of barriers needed to keep consumers. 
Hypothesis 2: Multi-sided digital platforms that employ a breaching strategy are more likely to achieve 
higher performance levels than the rival platforms that do not employ this strategy. 
                                                             
5 For example, Google, as a mobile platform provider itself (i.e., Android OS), offers applications on 
Apple’s iOS mobile platform. Some of these applications such as Google Maps, Google Search, and Gmail 
are among the most popular applications on the iOS platform. From Apple’s perspective, Google is 
seemingly a complementor at the product level; it is just another third party application developer. 
However, Google is also a competitor of Apple in the mobile platforms market, at the platform level. 
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The Joint Impact of the Innovation and Breaching Strategies 
Breaching strategy evokes and enhances experimentation and experience-based mechanisms of a platform 
provider, outcomes of which feed into exploratory learning and learning-by-doing instead of learning-
before-doing (Argote & Miron-spektor, 2011; Huber, 1991; Pisano, 1994). In complex adaptive systems, the 
key for achieving higher fitness levels is "to learn while in the middle of action; to think your way out while 
acting, and to act your way out while thinking" (McDaniel et al., 2003: 274) because successful learning is 
richly embedded in taking actions, not in considering consequences (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991). The 
lack of cause-and-effect relationships in complex adaptive systems requires organizations to engage in trial-
and-error experimentation and learn from this experience to achieve higher performance levels (Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000; Levitt & March, 1988). Pursuing a breaching strategy enables multi-sided platforms to 
expand their action spaces in a way that they go beyond "satisficing" learning points in their experiences 
(Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2002; Simon, 1979). These evolutionary searches create robustness and adaptability 
through constant experimentation (Beinhocker, 1999). We argue that experimentation through breaching 
actions using complementarity-based innovations contributes to adaptability rather than adaptation 
(Huber, 1991). This is because the value of exploratory searches through breaching actions in the form of a 
mix of short and long jumps over the landscape is leveraged by better-informed innovation episodes. A 
platform that employs a breaching strategy learns about emerging consumer needs and preferences on rival 
platforms as well as its own platform, and feed these insights into its new product development processes. 
Gaining access to emerging needs and preferences of consumers and complementors across the landscape 
enables a platform to cast its innovation web wide, facilitating the absorption of a broader scope of variety 
from the landscape (Beer, 1979, 1981). This competitive intelligence complements the innovation processes, 
enabling platforms to offer products that align better with emerging needs and preferences of consumers. 
Accordingly, we argue that the outcomes of a breaching strategy are likely to complement and positively 
reinforce the effects of a complementarity-based innovation strategy. This is because the effectiveness of an 
innovation strategy is contingent on the competitive intelligence on the emerging needs and preferences of 
consumers, which we refer to as the need for requisite variety (Ashby, 1958; Beer, 1979, 1981). Breaching 
strategy helps platforms selectively respond to the massive variety it confronts (Boisot & McKelvey, 2010). 
A platform that engages in an innovation strategy, but not in breaching can develop insights about the needs 
and preferences of consumers and complementors on its own platform and in the neighborhood area 
(Levinthal, 1997; March, 1991). However, it does not have access to insights about the emerging needs and 
preferences of consumers and complementors in rival territories. Thus, it engages in local or incremental 
search for innovation, which is likely to end at a local peak closest to the starting point of the search process, 
regardless of its height relative to other peaks in the landscape (Levinthal & Warglien, 1999). However, 
given that the overall landscape is turbulent and unpredictable —thus, dancing as well as rugged—, 
searching and innovating only locally can make platforms vulnerable to changes elsewhere in the landscape 
while they settle down on “sticking” points which may not even be local peaks (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2002). 
In addition, we expect a breaching strategy to increase the likelihood and effectiveness of learning from rare 
events and experiences (March et al., 1991). Taking long jumps allows platforms to break path dependencies 
and enables emergent learning based on rare experiences in the rivals’ territories by creating divergent 
learning trajectories (Cohen & Levinthal, 1994; Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009; Lampel & Shapira, 
2001). Taking these long jumps in addition to local search also makes harder the imitation of innovation 
strategies by competitors (Beinhocker, 1999; Rivkin, 2000), increasing the likelihood of sustainability in 
higher fitness. Therefore, we posit that the positive impact of a complementarity-based innovation strategy 
will increase when combined with a breaching strategy, enriched and enhanced by the provided intelligence. 
Hypothesis 3: Multi-sided platforms that employ a breaching strategy in addition to engaging in 
complementarity-based innovations are more likely to achieve higher performance levels than the rivals 
that engage in only complementarity-based innovations without employing a breaching strategy. 
Modeling Multi-Sided Platform Markets 
We use a computer simulation to model platform-based competition and test our propositions. Computer 
simulation is an increasingly significant methodological approach to theory development in organizational 
studies (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007; Nelson & Winter, 1977) and fits the objectives of this study 
well because of the following reasons. First, nonlinear dynamics that characterize the multi-sided platform 
ecosystems are not mathematically tractable; therefore, a computer simulation is more appropriate (Arthur, 
2013; Carley, 2005 in Baum, 2005). Second, computer simulations can reveal the outcomes of interactions 
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and interdependencies among strategic agents that unfold over time (Repenning, 2002). Third, computer 
simulations provide an effective research method for answering "what if" questions and moving beyond the 
current assumptions and theories (Romme, 2004). Finally, this research strategy provides insights into 
complex relationships that might not otherwise be possible to analyze due to data limitations (Zott, 2003). 
For these reasons, we designed an agent-based model (ABM), and carried out "computational experiments" 
(Maguire & McKelvey, 2006) to measure fitness levels in platform landscapes (Siggelkow, 2001). Another 
advantage of ABMs is the control in manipulation and measurement of crucial variables (Conway, 1959). 
We test the hypotheses posited in this paper in a model of the mobile digital platforms market. The agents 
in this simulation model are the platform providers and consumers. It is worth noting that we define only 
the simple rules these agents follow for their own benefits. We do not manipulate any system level variables 
in the model. System behavior and the outcomes of the model emerge from the interactions of the agents 
who follow the simple rules, which are defined based on theory and practice of platform-based competition. 
For the purpose of this study, we assume that whether applications are offered by platforms or independent 
developers does not affect the platform selection decisions of consumers. For consumers, utility is gained 
when their demand sets are matched on a platform. That is why independent application developers are 
not defined as separate agents in the model. Appendix A provides the detailed execution steps of the 
simulation model. In the developed simulation model, consumers aim to have consumption-side synergies. 
Choosing complementary application offerings, they minimize search, integration, interoperability, and 
compatibility costs, and maximize the ease of use. That is, consumers demand the value of the system to be 
greater than the sum of the values of the individual products, or to be super-additive (Tanriverdi & Lee, 
2008). Because consumers demand a super-additive system of complementary products, platforms 
compete to be single-stop shops for consumers (Lee, Venkatraman, Tanriverdi, & Iyer, 2010). Platforms 
aim to benefit from sub-additive cost synergies at the production side by offering complementary products. 
They renew their offerings by imitating their rivals and offering new products. Only when they are in an 
experimental treatment, they engage in innovation and breaching bounded by performance constraints. 
Model Assumptions and Agent Behavior 
We assume that the market is an oligopoly with four platforms because the four-firm concentration ratios 
tend to be high in digital platform markets. For example, in the mobile platform, internet browser, and 
video game console markets, the four-firm concentration ratios are more than 90% (StatCounter, 2014; 
Statista, 2014, 2015). Platforms in the model are identical two-sided ecosystems with consumers and 
application (app) offerings. We assumed that there is no distinction for consumers about whether a 
platform offers an app itself or an independent developer offers the application on the platform. Consumers 
have demand sets and they make platform selection decisions. Over time, they add and remove applications 
to/from their demand sets. As the compositions of their demand sets and platforms’ supply sets change, 
consumers reevaluate their platform selection decisions. They check the list of overlapping apps between 
their demand sets and a platform’s offerings, and calculate a utility score for each platform. Consumers 
follow the same rules in all experimental conditions and aim to maximize their utilities; however, they are 
not rational utility maximizers. They are boundedly rational with limited cognitive capacity to process the 
information that is available to them (Alchian, 1950; Simon, 1955). At each step, a randomly6 determined 
number of consumers reevaluate their options (i.e., alternative platforms) and decide whether to switch to 
another platform. 80% of the time, consumers add a new random app to their demand sets (i.e., engage in 
exploration). 20% of time, they drop the app that provides the lowest contribution to their utility scores. 
Platforms have supply sets and make decisions on application (app) offerings. Over time, they add and 
remove applications to/from their supply sets. 80% of the time, platforms add a new app to their supply 
sets. Platforms select the app to add by learning from their consumers. Platforms (1) read the demand sets 
of their own consumers, (2) identify the list of applications that are demanded by their consumers but not 
fulfilled yet, and (3) offer the app that is demanded the most. The most demanded app is not necessarily 
the app that makes a significant contribution to the platform’s fitness level because platforms do not have 
perfect information to know which application would contribute to their fitness the most. Platforms aim to 
maximize their fitness; however, they are not the utility maximizers of the rational actor theory. They make 
application offering decisions on limited information and bounded by performance constraints. Platforms 
have both limited information and a limited capacity to learn and execute what they learn (March & Simon, 
                                                             
6 All randomizations in the model use the “random” function of Java’s Math class (uniform distribution). 
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1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Simon, 1991). For these reasons, their decisions are suboptimal. 20% of the 
time, they drop the app that is demanded the least and that contributes to their fitness the least. This is 
because for application removal decisions, platforms own the information about the contribution of apps 
they already offer. The 80/20 ratio is based on empirical support. From the time Apple App Store was 
introduced until 2014, over 1.6 million apps have been introduced and 350 thousand apps have been pulled 
from the store (Adjust, 2014). That is, for 80 apps offered, approximately 20 apps are removed from the 
app stores. We tested the robustness of our results against this ratio as explained in the robustness analyses. 
When platforms offer a new application (app) 80% of the time7, they do so in two different ways. 90% of 
the time, they imitate their rivals. In this case, they offer an app only if the app is already offered by a 
platform in the landscape. 10% of the time, they offer an app randomly (i.e., they engage in exploration). 
The way the platforms add new applications is diversified in two ways only to increase ecosystem 
dynamism. During the initialization of the model, platforms choose up to five apps to offer. If all platforms 
start by offering only a few apps and there is not an innovator platform (i.e., the experiment is a control 
setting without treatment), the number of apps remains stagnant. In this case, the behavior of the model is 
not a good representation of the reality and the data generated by the model are not useful. Because one of 
the ways to build a structurally realistic model is to make it comply with the characteristics and behaviors 
of the real system (Grimm et al., 2005), we allowed platforms to add an application 10% (of the 80%; thus, 
8%) of the time randomly for exploration. Our results are robust to the rate at which platforms engage in 
this behavior. This rate affects only the number of times we need to run our model for consistent patterns. 
Measures and Manipulations 
Pairwise Complementarity Scores of the Applications 
Pairwise product complementarities can be inferred from the extent to which consumers use the products 
together (Lemelin, 1982). Therefore, following the product-market approach (Brooks, 1995), it is possible 
to calculate pairwise complementarity scores based on the extent to which consumers use a pair of products 
together. In our model, pairwise complementarity scores are calculated using the number of consumers 
who use each app pair. In a given time period, the score of an app pair is calculated as follows: 
𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑛 =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑛 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛 = 1 … 𝑀
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑖𝑗 =  
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑛
𝑀
𝑛=1
𝑀
       (1) 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗  is the pairwise complementarity score between apps 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 𝑀 denotes the total number of 
consumers in the market. Pairwise complementarity between application pairs are assumed symmetric. 
Consumer Utility Scores 
Consumers make platform adoption and switching, and application removal decisions based on the utilities 
gained from the fulfilled portion of their demand sets. A consumer’s utility is defined and calculated by the 
additive complementarity scores of the application pairs that consumers have in their demand sets and that 
are potentially fulfilled by a prospective platform. Therefore, consumers gain different amounts of utility 
from each platform in different time periods (as the compositions of demand sets and supply sets change). 
The utility a consumer gains from Platform A is calculated as follows: 
𝑢𝑛
𝐴 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑖,𝑗 ∈𝐴𝑛
𝑖≠𝑗
       (2) 
where 𝑢𝑛
𝐴 is the utility of consumer 𝑛,  𝐴𝑛 is the set of app pairs that consumer 𝑛 has in its demand set and 
that are fulfilled by platform A, and 𝑝𝑖𝑗  is the pairwise complementarity score between apps 𝑖 and 𝑗. 
Consumers adopt (or switch to) the platform that provides the highest utility; however, a stochastic 
multiplicative term is included in comparison of platform providers. That is, consumers make mistakes as 
                                                             
7 These offerings are not innovations, which are pursued only by the platforms treated in the experiments. 
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they compare utilities across platforms due to bounded rationality8. Among the platforms that provide the 
same utility to a consumer, consumers choose the platform with the highest number of other consumers: 
𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑛
𝐴  =  𝑢𝑛
𝐵  , 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝐴 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑀𝐴 >  𝑀𝐵 
𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑐𝑎 =  𝑢𝑐𝑏 , 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑀
𝐴 =  𝑀𝐵     
where 𝑢𝑛
𝐴 is the utility of consumer n from Platform A, 𝑢𝑛
𝐵 is the utility of consumer n from Platform B, and, 
𝑀𝐴 and 𝑀𝐵 are the numbers of consumers on platforms A and B, respectively. 
Platform Fitness Levels 
We operationalized fitness levels using the economic theory of complementarities. The theory shows that a 
collection of products is complementary if the products have a real-valued utility function with increasing 
differences, or super-modularity (Topkis, 1998). Super-modularity is identified as super-additive value 
synergies where the joint values are greater than the sum of their standalone values (Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman, 2005). Fitness levels are calculated by the weighted sum of pairwise complementarity scores 
of the all apps in the supply set of a platform, following an empirically validated approach (Lee et al., 2010): 
𝑓𝐴 = ∑ [
𝑝𝑖𝑗(∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑛)𝑛 ∈𝐶𝐴 )
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑛
𝑀
𝑛=1
]
𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝛼
𝑖≠𝑗
       (3) 
where 𝑓𝐴 is the fitness level of Platform A, α is the set of applications that is offered by Platform 𝐴, 𝐶 𝐴 is the 
set of consumers using Platform A, and 𝑝𝑖𝑗  is the pairwise complementarity score between apps 𝑖 and 𝑗. The 
fitness level of a platform that employs the breaching strategy is calculated as follows: 
𝑓𝐴 = ∑
𝑝𝑖𝑗  ( ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑝)𝑝∈𝐶𝐴 + ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑟)𝑟∈𝐶𝐵 )
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑛
𝑀
𝑛=1𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝛼
𝑖≠𝑗
       (4) 
where 𝑓𝐴 is the fitness level of Platform 𝐴 that take a breaching action into Platform 𝐵, 𝛼 is the set of 
applications that are offered by Platform 𝐴, 𝐶 𝐴 is the set of consumers using Platform A,  𝐶𝐵 is the set of 
consumers using Platform B,  and M is the number of consumers in the market. 
Switching Costs 
The sources of switching costs that are related to the consumer investments can be grouped into two 
categories: (1) breadth of use, and (2) extent of modification (Burnham et al., 2003). First, the breadth of 
use as a source of switching costs is defined as the extent to which a consumer employs a variety of products 
offered by a certain provider (Ram & Jung, 1990). As consumers buy complements and add supplements 
to the core product, the intrinsic retainability of the consumers increases (Blattberg & Deighton, 1996). 
Second, the modification of a product as a source of switching costs is defined as the extent to which 
consumers adapt the offered products so that they better serve consumers’ individual needs (Burnham et 
al., 2003). As the amount of modifications on adopted products increases, switching costs increase because 
such modifications must be replicated upon switching providers (Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, & Fahy, 1993). 
To measure the breadth of use in the mobile digital platforms context, we use the number of applications. 
As the number of applications consumers own on a mobile platform increases, switching costs related to 
the breadth of use also increase. A consumer who switches to another platform needs to create the same 
application complementarity relationships on the new platform. As the number of applications increases, 
this creation becomes more costly. To measure the extent of modification, we use time. As the time 
consumers spent on a mobile platform increases, switching costs related to the extent of modification also 
increase. As the time spent on a platform increases, the modifications on applications and porting of data 
accumulated in the applications become more costly because the extent of modifications and the amount of 
data accumulation are likely to increase over time. In the context we focus on, the number of applications 
and the time spent on a platform are likely to jointly increase learning costs as well. More applications used 
on a platform for longer periods tend to lock in consumers. Our model has a conditional decision criterion: 
                                                             
8 We did not limit the recognition of available platforms in the landscape, as there are only four platforms. 
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Switch only if 𝑡𝑛
𝑃  
𝛽𝑛
𝑃
𝛿𝑃
<  
∑ 𝑡𝑛
𝑃𝑀
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝜃𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑠𝑒
𝜃𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑
       (5) 
where 𝑡𝑛
𝑃 is the time consumer n spends on the most recent Platform P. Every time a consumer switches to 
a new platform, the time is reset to 0. 𝛽𝑛
𝑃  is the number of apps consumer n owns on the most recent 
platform P, 𝛿𝑃 is the total number of apps available in the most recent Platform P’s supply set, M is the 
number of consumers in the market, 𝜃𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑠𝑒 is the number of apps that are in use (at the calculation time) 
by all consumers in the market, and 𝜃𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 is the number of all apps that are offered by all platforms. 
Therefore, in a given time period, consumers are likely to subject to different amounts of switching costs. 
Manipulated Variables 
Innovation. We operationalized innovation as the introduction of new applications that are not available 
anywhere in the landscape yet. To innovate, platforms (1) read the demand sets of their own consumers, (2) 
identify the list of applications that are demanded by their consumers but not fulfilled by any platform in 
the landscape, and (3) offer the application that is demanded the most. If there is more than one application 
(app) that is demanded the most, platforms select among them randomly. The most demanded app is not 
necessarily the app that makes a significant contribution to the platform’s fitness level because platforms 
do not have perfect information to identify the app that would contribute to their fitness levels the most. 
This is because complementarity scores are a function of the overall market demand, which is not visible to 
any platform in the landscape. Organization scholars inform us that organizations make decisions using 
limited information, and they have a limited capacity to learn and execute what they learn (March & Simon, 
1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Simon, 1991). In other words, some innovations can (and do) fail in the model. 
Breaching. To take breaching actions, (1) platforms read the demand sets of their own consumers, (2) 
identify the list of supplied applications that are demanded by their consumers but not offered by their rival 
with the highest number of consumers, and (3) offer the most demanded application to the rival platform 
that has the highest number of consumers. If there is more than one application that is demanded by the 
maximum number of consumers, platforms select one of these applications randomly to utilize it in their 
breaching actions. Offering the most demanded app in their own platforms may not provide platforms a 
significant enough fitness contribution. That is, breaching actions can (and do) fail in the model. The 
implementation of breaching decisions in our model is supported by the practice and theory of platform 
markets. Mobile digital platforms such as Google and Blackberry made statements confirming the rule we 
defined in this simulation model: Offer applications only on rival platforms that have a large number of 
consumer base (Vasile, 2014; Whittaker, 2012). The decision rule platforms follow in expanding to a rival 
platform with a large consumer base is also supported by the studies of network effects (Shankar & Bayus, 
2003; Zhu & Iansiti, 2007, 2012). We operationalized breaching as a platform strategy to gain fitness 
benefits through exploratory and experiential learning by expanding into rival territories. Thus, platforms 
that employ the breaching strategy benefit in two ways. First, they learn from the consumers on target 
platforms by reading their demand sets (in addition to reading the demand sets of their own consumers; 
hence, exploratory learning)9. Second, the applications used in breaching actions can contribute to platform 
fitness levels through the adoption of these apps by the consumers on target platforms (see Equation 4). 
Design and Analysis of Computational Experiments 
To test the significance of the impact by the three focal strategies on fitness, we run the simulation model 
without any manipulated platforms (i.e., all platforms have the same conditions; control setting). Then, we 
enable one of the platforms to use the tested strategy, and run the simulation model again (i.e., treatment 
setting). In running simulation models, we take the averages for each period of the 200 periods in each 
simulation run. In other words, all periods (t=0,1, 2, 3…199) are repeated 200 times to increase reliability. 
Thus, 200 runs of a single time period generates only one observation. We run a two-sample Wilcoxon 
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test (i.e., rank-sum in Stata) to compare the fitness level of the manipulated 
platform in the treatment setting with its fitness level in the control setting. Wilcoxon Mann–Whitney test 
is useful to compare two settings and to test whether if one setting contributes more to higher ranked values. 
                                                             
9 At this point, it is worth noting that platforms cannot fully execute what they learn from these breaching 
actions. They rely solely on demand information in their decisions and the demand information per se 
does not guarantee the highest fitness contribution. This is because we know that organizations have a 
limited capacity to execute what they learn (March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Simon, 1991). 
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It is more efficient than the t-test on non-normal distributions, such as a mixture of normal distributions, 
and it is nearly as efficient as the t-test on normal distributions. We collect the data on the performance 
level of a platform in the control setting and compare it with the performance level of the same platform in 
the treatment setting. Therefore, our experiments can be defined as within-subjects designs; however, 
because all platform providers in our model are identical, and random parameters generate independent 
subjects every time the model is run, our experiments can also be defined as between-subjects designs. 
# Control setting Treatment 
setting 
Comparison 
statistic 
Z score (Prob>|z|) 
Probability that subject will 
perform better on the 
treatment than in the controla 
A Base setting (Imitation)  
Innovation 
z = -12.514 
(0.0000) 
 86.2%*** 
B Base setting (Imitation)  
 
Breaching 
z = -4.281 
(0.0000) 
 62.4%*** 
C Innovation (without Imitation) z = -7.577 
(0.0000) 
 71.9%*** 
D Imitation and Innovation z = -2.557 
(0.0106) 
 57.4%* 
Sensitivity and Robustness Analyses 
E Imitation and Innovation 
(Structural change: 
Consumers as rational actors) 
 
 
 
 
 
Breaching 
z = -1.880 
(0.0601) 
 55.4%† 
F Imitation and Innovation 
(Structural change:  
Platforms as rational actors) 
z =  3.530 
(0.0004) 
 39.8%***b 
G Imitation and Innovation 
(Structural change: 
Consumers and platforms 
both as rational actors) 
z = -3.108 
(0.0019) 
 59.0%** 
† p < .10  * p < .05  **p < .01  *** p < .001 
a Probabilities in the original statistical test output are reversed (i.e., 1-p) and converted into percentages. 
b As the value is lower than 50%, breaching strategy has a negative effect on fitness in this experiment. 
Table 1: Two-sample Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) test results for the experiments 
Results 
First, we tested whether the level of turbulence in our model follows our conceptual development and that 
in the empirical observations discussed earlier. We did not posit a hypothesis on turbulence; however, our 
theoretical development resided on the assumption of a turbulent, unpredictable market. This is why we 
calculated (1) the sum of average rank ordering changes, (2) number of times the market leader changes, 
and (3) probability that a platform sustains its performance level over time. The first measure shows how 
volatile the changes in performance positions (or fitness levels) in the market and it is calculated as follows: 
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 =  ∑
∑ |𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡
𝑝
− 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡−1
𝑝 |𝑃𝑝=1
𝑃
200
𝑡=1
 
where 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡
𝑝
 is the rank order of Platform p at time t, and P is the total number of platforms. The second 
measure defines how many times the market leader is dethroned and is calculated by taking counts over 
periods. The results point to similar dynamics observed in the empirical instances such as in the internet 
browser or mobile platform markets discussed earlier. We found that the mean of the sum of average rank 
ordering changes in our simulation model is about 25, and the market leader is dethroned about 16 times 
in 200 time periods, on average. The probability that a platform sustains its performance rank ordering at 
least half of the time is found to be only about 15%. The probability is variable over time and has a positively 
skewed distribution with a median value of about 4.5%. Therefore, we conclude that the level of turbulence 
that emerges in our model is in accordance with our conceptual development and empirical observations. 
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* SE denotes standard errors, which is the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of the mean. 
Figure 3: Platform fitness levels in breaching, innovation, & imitation vs. innovation & imitation 
Our first hypothesis stated that multi-sided platforms that engage in complementarity-based innovations 
perform better than their rivals that do not employ the strategy. To test our first hypothesis, we compared 
the performance level of a platform in the control setting where it only imitates its rivals against the 
treatment setting where it employs a complementarity-based innovation strategy in addition to imitating 
its rivals. The results are shown in Table 1, Experiment A. The complementarity-based innovation strategy 
has a statistically significant positive effect on platform performance (p < 0.01). The effect is strong. 86.2% 
of the time, multi-sided platforms that engage in both complementarity-based innovations and imitations 
perform better than their rivals that only engage in imitations. This finding supports Hypothesis 1. 
Our second hypothesis stated that multi-sided platforms that take breaching actions into rival territories 
perform better than their rivals that do not employ the strategy. Because our model includes only two 
strategies other than the breaching, we compared the performance effects of breaching strategy against 
these two strategies in Experiment B (breaching vs. imitation) and Experiment C (breaching vs. 
innovation). In Experiment B, we compared the performance level of a platform in the control setting where 
it only imitates its rivals against the treatment setting where it employs the breaching strategy in addition 
to imitating its rivals. The results are shown in Table 1, Experiment B. Breaching strategy has a statistically 
significant positive effect on platform performance (p < 0.01). 62.4% of the time, multi-sided platforms that 
employ the breaching strategy perform better than their rivals that only engage in imitations. In Experiment 
C, we compared the performance level of a platform in the control setting where it only engages in 
complementarity-based innovations against the treatment setting where it employs the breaching strategy 
in addition to engaging in innovations. Table 1 (Experiment C) shows that the effect is still positive, 
statistically significant (p < 0.01), and strong. 71.9% of the time, innovator platforms that use a breaching 
strategy in addition to pursuing complementarity-based innovations perform better than their rivals that 
only engage in complementarity-based innovations. Compared to the effect found in Experiment B, the 
breaching strategy has a higher contribution to platform fitness in Experiment C. This may be because the 
contribution of breaching actions is more critical in a market where a platform uses the learning from 
breaching in its innovation decisions rather than in its imitation decisions (see Hypothesis 3). By definition, 
innovation decisions include a novel offering that is not offered yet anywhere in the landscape. Therefore, 
innovation decisions bear more uncertainty than imitation decisions where offerings are already in use in 
other parts of the landscape. Breaching contributes more in managing the unpredictability arising from 
innovation decisions. Limited space prevented us from presenting more figures; however, in this setting, 
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breaching is effective earlier in the competition than it is in Experiment B. This may be because in a setting 
where a platform does not imitate others but only innovates, it starts to diverge from their rivals earlier. 
Our third hypothesis stated that employing a breaching strategy positively reinforces the fitness effects of 
the complementarity-based innovation strategy. In Experiment C, we already showed that a platform that 
employs both the innovation and breaching strategies perform better than the control setting where it only 
engages in innovations. In Experiment D, we compare a platform in the base setting (i.e., imitation) that 
engages in complementarity-based innovations with the treatment setting where it employs both the 
complementarity-based innovation and breaching strategies. Table 1 (Experiment D) shows that breaching 
has a statistically significant positive effect (p < 0.05). Figure 3 shows a comparison of the performance 
levels in this setting. A close inspection of the figure reveals that after accounting for the standard errors, 
the effect is more salient later in the competition. There may be at least two reasons for this behavior. First, 
when a platform already imitates its rivals and innovates, it constantly introduces new offerings in two 
different forms. All these new offerings aim to attract consumers and increase its fitness levels. Thus, the 
likelihood of a marginal contribution to the platform performance earlier in the competition is likely to be 
lower. Second, as a platform imitates its rivals and innovates, it already interacts with a diverse set of 
consumers who switch in and out of its platform. The value in exploratory and experiential learning from 
the consumers of rivals could become valuable only after the rivals attract a significant number of 
consumers and consumers begin to move more slowly. Overall, multi-sided platforms that employ the 
breaching strategy in addition to the innovation strategy perform better 57.4% of time than their rivals that 
only engage in innovations. Experiment D provides support for Hypothesis 3, in addition to Experiment C. 
Sensitivity and Robustness Analyses and Additional Insights from the Model 
In this section, we evaluate whether our model reproduces the observed patterns robustly or whether our 
results are sensitive to changes in the model (1) parameters and (2) structure (Railsback & Grimm, 2011). 
First, we tested our model’s sensitivity against the variance in our model parameters and found that our 
conclusions are robust to these variations. The initialization parameters are as follows: (a) the number of 
platforms (“4”), (b) number of consumers (“200”), (c) number of applications (“100”), (d) number of apps 
each consumer adds to demand set (“5”), (e) number of apps each platform offers (“5”), and (f) the ratio at 
which platform providers add and remove applications to/from their supply sets (“80/20”). We varied these 
parameters in a broad range (50%) and found that the changes in these parameters do not change the results 
qualitatively. Not surprisingly, the results change quantitatively due to the random parameters in the 
model, and the model completion times change based on the varying parameters. Therefore, we conclude 
that our results are robust (not sensitive to) the model parameters10. Next, we tested the model structure. 
The experiments we conducted while we tested the model’s sensitivity against the changes in the model 
structure revealed additional insights. As we conceptualized, complex adaptive platform markets are 
associated with a high level of unpredictability. Nonlinear interactions among the diverse agents in these 
markets lead to a kind of fundamental uncertainty that is not decomposable to parts (Arthur, 2013; Carley, 
2005 in Baum, 2005). In this type of a market, the assumptions about the agents’ access to information and 
their decision making structures could be critical. Agents in our model were assumed boundedly rational. 
That is, we assumed that consumers are not rational utility maximizers and platforms did not have perfect 
information. To test the effects of these assumptions on the results, we first relaxed the bounded rationality 
assumption for consumers, and tested the effect of breaching again. Table 1 (Experiment E) shows the 
results. In the setting where consumers are rational utility maximizers with perfect information about their 
choices and unlimited cognitive ability to evaluate these choices, the positive effects of breaching actions 
persist with a marginal significance (p-value is 0.0601 vis-à-vis 0.0106 in Experiment D). In this setting, 
breaching platforms perform better than their rivals 55.4% of the time (vis-à-vis 57.4% in Experiment D). 
We also assumed that platform providers do not have perfect information about the fitness contributions 
of individual application offerings. In our original model, multi-sided platforms rely on the portion of the 
demand data they can access to make application offering decisions; hence, these decisions are not 
necessarily translated into high fitness contributions. Next, we relaxed this assumption, keeping in place 
the bounded rationality assumption for the consumers. We allowed platform providers to have perfect 
information about the fitness contributions of individual applications. The results are shown in Table 1 
                                                             
10 Due to the limited space, we do not report the details of the sensitivity analyses on model parameters. 
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(Experiment F). When a platform has the information on the fitness contributions of individual applications 
but consumers remain as being boundedly rational, breaching strategy has a negative effect on fitness (p < 
0.01). In this setting, breaching platforms perform better than their rivals only 39.8% of the time. This is 
an interesting finding because platforms could be expected to improve their decisions with more 
information, and the improvement would be reflected in their fitness levels. To make sense of the results 
from these experiments, we ran another experiment where both consumers are rational utility maximizers 
and platforms have the perfect information. In a way, we defined both agent types according to rational 
choice theory. Table 1 (Experiment G) shows the results. Breaching strategy has a positive effect that is 
statistically significant (p < 0.01). Breaching platforms perform better than their rivals 59.0% of the time. 
Our interpretation is as follows. In a turbulent, unpredictable market, not only the strategy to be pursued 
but also how it is pursued is important. First, when consumers are rational actors but platforms behave as 
if the demand sets of the consumers are not reliable and engage in experimentation instead, in an 
environment of perfect information, the contribution of breaching strategy is positive but only marginally 
significant. Second, when consumers are boundedly rational but platforms behave as if the consumers are 
rational actors and rely on consumer demand for their offering decisions instead of experimenting, the 
effect of breaching strategy on platform performance is negative. This may be because prospective 
customers may or may not be able to articulate their needs and preferences in their demand sets (Von 
Hippel, 1994); however, platform providers assume that the demand sets of consumers reflect their future 
actions. In reality, what consumers seem to demand in a time period may not be what they choose to adopt 
in the next time period. If platform providers use the learning from breaching in a market where consumers 
are boundedly rational behaving as if the consumers are rational actors, they begin to make poor decisions. 
In Experiments E and F, there is not a fit between the decision rules that platforms follow in implementing 
their strategies and consumer decision structures. We conclude that our findings on the effects of breaching 
strategy are robust to critical changes in model structure. However, the finding that a breaching strategy 
makes a positive, significant contribution to fitness inasmuch as the way the strategy implemented has a fit 
with consumer decision structures is interesting and require further theoretical and empirical investigation. 
Conclusion 
Our results showed that complementarity-based innovation strategy and breaching strategy, as we 
identified and conceptualized, contribute to platform performance in multi-sided platform markets. More 
specifically, we found that breaching strategy complements and positively reinforces the effects of the 
complementarity-based innovation strategy; i.e., the learning through breaching is valuable to the extent 
that it is leveraged by engaging in complementarity-based innovations. Even though the importance of 
learning and exploration is hardly controversial, we showed how exploratory and experiential learning can 
be prosecuted in the platform strategy context, and how such a strategy can translate into higher 
performance levels in a complex fitness landscape. Because the complexity arising from the nonlinear 
interactions of the system constituents as well as the network and lock-in effects leads to a morphing 
landscape in which existing peaks collapse and new peaks emerge constantly, multi-sided platforms could 
pursue the joint use of innovation and breaching as a strategy to achieve and sustain higher fitness levels. 
We also contribute to the theory of multi-sided platform markets by showing that platform-based 
competitors should not necessarily focus on migrating consumers from rivals, and while doing so, struggle 
with the rivals’ barriers such as strong network and lock-in effects. A breaching strategy can help multi-
sided platform competitors achieve higher performance levels without having to migrate consumers, 
particularly in combination with the complementarity-based innovation strategy. We contribute to the 
practice of multi-sided markets by showing that even if a platform provider cannot eliminate the need for 
managing complexity, breaching and innovation strategies can help tame the challenges arising from it. 
Platform providers could take breaching actions into rival turfs and leverage them by complementarities. 
Limitations 
Our study has limitations in that we only manipulated three competitive strategies and assumed all other 
factors equal in our simulations. In practice, there are also variations in other parameters such as in revenue 
models of platforms, types of consumers and complementors, heterogeneity of independent developers, 
and a potential set of single-homing and multi-homing behaviors by consumers. Now that we built an 
experimental platform, where such variations can also be manipulated and simulated, future research can 
extend this study and further advance our understanding of the competitive dynamics in platform markets. 
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Appendix A: The Execution Steps of the Simulation Model 
 
Before the Steps (Initialization) 
1. 100 apps are created and pairwise complementarity scores are randomly assigned to these apps. 
2. Consumers/platforms add 5 random complementary apps to their demand/supply sets. 
3. Consumers select and adopt the platform that provides the highest utility. 
At Each Step (Time Periods) 
1. Pairwise complementarity scores are updated based on the consumers’ selections. 
2. A randomly selected number of consumers reevaluate alternative the platforms and choose a 
platform to adopt (if not adopted before), or choose a platform to switch to: 
a. If only one platform provides the highest utility11 and a consumer satisfies the switching 
cost criterion, then the consumer selects the platform. 
b. If more than one platform provides the same amount of utility to a consumer and the 
consumer satisfies the switching cost criterion, then the consumer selects randomly. 
c. If there is not a platform that provides a higher amount of utility than the current utility a 
consumer has, then the consumer does not make a selection. 
3. Consumers’ utility scores and the number of consumers platforms have are updated. 
4. Platforms’ fitness levels are updated and consumers’ tenures on a platform are updated. 
5. Three application lists are created for each platform: 
a. A list of the applications that are demanded by own consumers, 
b. a list of the applications that are demanded but currently not offered, 
c. and a list of the applications that are demanded and currently offered. 
6. Consumers add/remove a new app: 
a. 80% of the time, consumers add a new random app to their demand sets. 
b. 20% of the time, consumers remove the app that provides the lowest utility. 
7. Platforms add/remove a new app: 
a. 80% of the time, platforms add a new app to their supply sets in two ways: 
i. 90% of the time, they add an app that is demanded by their consumers and 
already offered by the other platforms in the landscape (imitation). They choose 
the app that is demanded the most12. If there are multiple, they choose randomly. 
ii. 10% of the time, they add an app that is demanded by their consumers the most11. 
If there are multiple, they choose randomly. 
b. 20% of the time, they remove the app that is demanded the least and that contributes to 
fitness the least. If there are multiple, they choose randomly. 
8. Innovation: If a platform is manipulated for innovation, it adds a new app that is demanded by 
their consumers and not yet offered by the other platforms in the landscape under performance 
constraints. The platform chooses the app that is demanded the most13. If there are multiple, it 
chooses randomly. 
9. Breaching: If a platform is manipulated for breaching, it lists the applications in its supply set, 
identifies those that are not offered by its rivals with the highest number of consumers, and offer 
the app that is demanded the most13 to the rival platform with the highest number of consumers. 
If there are multiple, they choose randomly. 
                                                             
11 Consumers are assumed boundedly rational and they make mistakes in comparing potential utilities. 
12 The most demanded app is not necessarily the app that provides a significant fitness contribution. 
13 Innovations/breaching can (and do) fail in the model because the most demanded application is not 
necessarily the one that makes a significant enough contribution to platform fitness. 
